ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
e examine the difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms and effect of auditing by Big 4 audit firms on the investment efficiency of firms. Whether firms have been listed or not affects financial reporting and managers' decision making (Beatty, Ke & Petroni, 2002; Ball The basic measures are devised to detect all of earnings adjustment type, such as income smoothing and earnings management. They argue that unlisted firms exhibit lower accrual quality. Nichols, Wahlen and Wieland (2009) presented empirical evidence that unlisted banks are less conservative than listed banks. This indicates that the listing status refers to the form of the capital market which the firm belongs and the FRQ varies depending on the listing status. Hope et al. (2013) document that in general unlisted firms have lower earnings quality and have less accounting conservatism. These results indicate that listed firms have higher demand for high quality financial information. Nam (2010) studies the qualitative characteristics of accounting information for listed and unlisted small business. Listed small business shows high persistence of accounting information, low degree of income smoothing, and low performance adjustment discretionary accruals. Listed small business shows that the FRQ is higher than that of unlisted small business because the demand of accounting information of stakeholders is high.
Other studies provide evidence that unlisted firms have higher accrual quality. Beatty et al. (2002) focus on earnings manipulations and use a sample of 1,160 unlisted banks and 707 listed banks. They find that relative to listed banks, unlisted banks are less likely to manage their accounting information to avoid income decrease, suggesting that accrual quality is higher in unlisted banks. Kim and Yi (2006) document that unlisted firms are less likely to manage earnings to meet stakeholder expectations, which negatively affects the FRQ. Using a sample of 531 firms, Givoly et al. (2010) find that unlisted firms have higher accrual quality, lower propensity to handle financial reporting, and higher accrual persistence than do listed firms.
FRQ and Investment Efficiency
As mentioned above, prior studies suggest that the FRQ can decrease information asymmetry between firms and investors. Therefore, if the information asymmetry decreases, the reverse selection costs and financing costs become lower, which makes the right decision when selecting the investment plan (Verdi, 2006) . According to a study of the effects of the FRQ on capital costs, when the FRQ is higher, the financing costs are lower (Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004) , and investment efficiency of a firm is higher (Verdi, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009 ). In addition, reverse selection cost is also reduced at the time of earnings announcement (Bhattacharya, Desai & Venkataraman, 2007) .
Accruals have been found to provide useful information for predicting future cash flows. From the viewpoint of the creditor, it is difficult to estimate the future cash flow using accounting information when the accruals quality is low, so that the uncertainty about the debt repayment of the firm increases. If the future cash flow is estimated based on the accruals on the investor's side, the quality of accruals may affect uncertainty on future performance distribution of the firm, which causes asymmetric information between information and non-information investors (Bhattacharya et al. 2007) . Therefore, if the borrower has low accruals quality, the cost of financing will rise and affect contracts with stakeholders.
A study of the FRQ also examined the effects of asymmetric information and agency cost on firms' cash holdings. Biddle et al. (2009) find that the FRQ reduces inefficient investments (over-investment and under-investment) in firms with a lot of cash holdings and with financial constraints. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) also find that the FRQ improves investment efficiency and increases expected cash flow through a model that takes into account the relevance of the FRQ and cash flow. Garcia-Teruel, Martinez-Solano and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009) report that firms with higher quality of accruals have lower cash holdings than firms with lower quality of accruals. Therefore, these evidences show that FRQ can decrease asymmetric information and cost of adverse selection, which can reduce the level of cash holdings.
Hypotheses Development
Listed and unlisted firms have different methods of financing, dispersion of stocks (ownership structure), size of firms, and number of stakeholders. As a result, the incentives for financial reporting differ and there is a difference in the FRQ (Kwak & Park, 2010) . Givoly et al. (2010) document that favor either listed firms or unlisted firms as having higher FRQ as demand and opportunistic behavior hypotheses. The demand hypotheses argue that the demand for higher FRQ is greater among listed firms. Listed firms have greater owner-manager division, greater ownership dispersion than do unlisted firms (Hope et al., 2013) . These ownership structures create asymmetric information, leading stakeholders to demand high-quality information. In contrast, the opportunistic behavior hypotheses argue that listed firms hide true performance by handling financial information. Listed firms have incentives to handle earnings due to market pressures (Graham et al., 2005) . However, in the case of listed firms, stock trading happens frequently and the importance of external financial reporting is high. Thus, listed firm stakeholders demand high quality of accounting information.
The incentive for a listed firm to improve the FRQ or to manage earnings is determined by comparing between the costs and benefits involved in each decision (Nam, 2010) . Generally, listed firms are expected to have more of the costs from opportunistic behavior of managers than benefits. Due to the relatively large number of stakeholders, listed firms have large costs (firm reputation, financing, stock prices, and legal action) when opportunistic behavior is discovered. Prior studies provide the general conclusion that on average, listed firms have higher FRQ and report more conservative accounting, consistent with the demand hypothesis dominating the opportunistic behavior hypothesis. Several previous studies have shown that the higher the FRQ, the better the investment efficiency by alleviating market friction such as reverse selection and moral hazard (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Bushman & Smith, 2001) . In other words, financial reporting is used by shareholders to keep watch on managers, and is an important source of information on firm risk for investors (Kanodia & Lee, 1998) . If qualitative financial reporting enhances shareholders' ability to keep watch managers' investment activities, it can increase investment efficiency by decreasing moral hazard. Also, if qualitative financial reporting reduces the cost of reverse selection, it can increase investment efficiency by decreasing the cost of financing and the likelihood of acquiring additional funds at misleading prices. In other words, reliable accounting information raises the monitoring level of the managers' moral hazard and positively affects the managers' investment decision. Based on the above description, we expect that listed firms to be more efficient than unlisted firms, and set the following hypotheses:
H 1 : Listed firms will have higher investment efficiency than unlisted firms; H 1a : Listed firms will be less likely to make abnormal over-investments compared to unlisted firms; and H 1b : Listed firms will be less likely to make abnormal under-investments compared to unlisted firms.
Managers make decisions that conflict with interests of shareholders to pursue their own interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Managers can distort investment decisions, one of the most important decisions in the process of pursuing their own interests. High-quality accounting information is one means of reducing the manager's moral hazard and reverse selection (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia, 2007) . Reliable accounting information reduces the reverse selection of external investors and information asymmetry between investors and firms. This prevents managers from investing in scale expansion. Biddle, (2009) investigate the effect of FRQ on each investment by dividing into under-investment and over-investment. The results show that high quality accounting information reduces both over-investment and under-investment. DeAngelo (1981) argues that independent external auditing reduces stakeholders' information asymmetry problems. Prior studies find that firms employing Big 4 auditors have a greater quality of financial reporting (Reynolds & Francis, 2000) . In general, Big 4 audit firms have more efficient resources and expertise in performing an audit. The auditing by Big 4 audit firms (BIG4) is a constraint on managers' opportunistic and inadequate accounting in financial reporting. Therefore, listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm are expected to have excellent financial reporting. Based on the above description, we expect that listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm will have a greater investment efficiency than those that do not and set the following hypotheses: H 2 : Listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm will have a greater investment efficiency than those that do not; H 2a : Listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm will be less likely to make abnormal over-investments than those that do not; and
RESEARCH DESIGN

Empirical Models
Investment Efficiency Between Listed and Unlisted Firms
We first test for difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms (H1) using Equation (1). Following Chen et al. (2011) , we regress the model (1) separately for under-investment and over-investment. The basic model is:
LIST it is an indicator variable that if firms are listed firms, it takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. β 1 represents the differential investment efficiency for listed and unlisted firms. In the model (1), if the coefficient of LIST it shows a significant negative (-) value, it indicates that listed firms have higher investment efficiency than unlisted firms. On the other hand, if the coefficient of LIST it shows a significant positive (+) value, it indicates that listed firms have lower investment efficiency than unlisted firms.
We include numerous control variables associated with firms' investment efficiency. Since the higher firm size (SIZE) and profitability (ROA), the higher investment efficiency is expected, the related variables are controlled (Chen et al., 2011) . The ratio of cash holding (SLACK) is included to identify variables that affect either investment or financing. We also include variables on financial reporting quality (FRQ1, FRQ2, FRQ3) to control over-investment effects. Liu and Wysocki (2007) suggest that a combination of cash flow and sales volatilities subsumes the relation between accruals quality and proxies for the cost of capital. Thus, we control for the ratio of operating cash flow (Cfo_Sales) and sales volatility (Std_Sales). Additionally, we control for audit by a Big 4 audit firm (BIG4), the ratio of tangible assets (TANG), length of the operating cycle (OPCYCLE), whether a firm reports a loss or not (LOSS), operating cash flow volatility (Std_Cfo), and competitive intensity (HHI). Finally, we include industry and year fixed effect.
Effect of Big 4 Auditors on Investment Efficiency
Because prior research finds that firms employing a Big 4 audit firm have a greater quality of financial reporting, we adapt the model (2) to catch the effect of Big 4 audit firms on investment efficiency as follows: s
In the model (2), the interest variable is LIST*BIG4 it , which is the interaction variable between LIST it (an indicator variable indicating listing status) and BIG4 it (an indicator variable indicating whether firms employing a Big 4 audit firm or not). The coefficient of LIST*BIG4 it indicates the difference in investment efficiency between listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm and those that are not. If the coefficient value shows a significant negative (-) value, it means that the listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm have a greater investment efficiency than those that do not. In other words, Big 4 audit firms provide high quality audit services, which can be seen as improving the investment efficiency of the firm. The control variables use the same variables as the model (1).
Measurement of Variable
Investment Efficiency
Based on a study conducted by Chen et al. (2011) , we use investment forecasting model as a growth opportunity function. Thus, investment efficiency is measured by the residuals of investment forecasting model and both under-investment and over-investment are considered inefficient. When there are more than 10 samples in each industry according to the middle classification of the Korean standard industry classification, the following model (3) is regressed by year and industry to estimate the coefficients, and then investment efficiency is measured by the residuals. The forecasting model is:
Following Chen et al. (2011), we explain Invest it as the total of new investment in equipment, machine, vehicle, buildings, lands, and R&D expenditures, less the disposal of fixed assets, and scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in year t. SalesGrowth it-1 is the annual sales growth rate for firm i in year t-1. NEG it-1 takes the value of 1 for negative sales growth, and 0 otherwise. We classify inefficient investment as over-investment (if the residuals are greater than zero) and under-investment (if the residuals are less than zero). 1 For ease of interpretation, the under-investment variable is multiplied by -1. Thus, it is interpreted that the lower the value, the higher the investment efficiency regardless of the over-investment and under-investment.
Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ)
We employ three measures that have been used in prior research. The first measure is performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as developed by Kothari, Leone & Wasley (2005) . We estimate the following model by each industry that has at least 10 observations:
where TAccr it is total accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current noninterest-bearing liabilities, minus depreciation and amortization expense for firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total assets (Assets it-1 ); ∆Rev it is the annual change in revenue scaled by lagged total assets; PPE it is property, plant, and equipment for firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total assets; ROA it is return on assets for firm i at year t. The residuals from the regression model are discretionary accruals. We multiply the absolute values of discretionary accruals by -1. Thus, higher values of discretionary accruals represent higher FRQ.
The second measure is based on the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, as modified Francis et al. (2004) . We estimate the following model by each industry that has at least 10 observations:
where TAccr it is total current accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current non-interest-bearing liabilities, scaled by lagged total assets; OCF is cash flow from operations; ∆Rev it is the annual change in revenue scaled by lagged total assets; PPE it is property, plant, and equipment, scaled by lagged total assets. The residuals from the regression model are discretionary accruals. We multiply the absolute values of discretionary accruals by -1. Thus, higher values of discretionary accruals represent higher FRQ.
Our third measure is the discretionary revenues as presented in McNichols and Stubben (2008) . Specifically, we use the following regression:
where ∆AR it represents the annual change in accounts receivable and ∆Rev it is the annual change in revenues, each scaled by lagged total assets. The residuals from the regression model are discretionary revenues. We multiply the absolute values of discretionary revenues by -1. Thus, higher values of discretionary revenues represent higher FRQ.
Sample
The total sample used in this study is the data of listed and unlisted firms in the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) from 2002 to 2014. 2 We collect financial data from TS-2000 database for analysis. Financial institutions are excluded from the sample because their operating characteristics and financial statement accounts are different from non-financial firms. For comparability, we include only firms with fiscal year ends in December and total liabilities do not exceed total assets. We also excluded firms that are unable to collect the financial data required for our study. Finally, in order to remove the effect of extreme observations, all variables are winsorized at the upper/lower 1% level. The final sample used in our empirical analysis is 75,478 firm-year observations. In the yearly distribution, listed firms are 13,717 firm-year observations and unlisted firms are 61,761 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2014 (untabulated). The observations of unlisted firms are relatively large. Table 1 The results show that firms with high quality of financial reporting are making efficient investments and that inefficient investments are made due to the effects of competition in industries with high competition intensity. It seems that there is a tendency to deviate from expectations when operating cash flow and sales volatility are large and losses occur. As a result of examining the VIF to determine the existence of multi-collinearity between variables, there is no multi-collinearity problem in all variables. Since the above results do not control the effect of other variables on investment efficiency, we conduct multivariate regression analysis including several control variables. Table 4 provides the regression results of testing H1 by showing the difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms. In the full sample, the coefficient of LIST is significantly negative (β 1 =-0.002, t=-1.94), suggesting that investment efficiency of listed firms is greater than investment efficiency of unlisted firms. Since listed firms have a better quality of financial reporting than unlisted firms, information asymmetry, costs of financing, and reverse selection costs are reduced. For this reason, listed firms are interpreted as investing more efficiently.
EMPRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Multivariate Results
Difference in Investment Efficiency Between Listed and Unlisted Firms
In the over-investment, the coefficient of LIST is significantly negative (β 1 =-0.007, t=-3.27), suggesting that investment efficiency of listed firms is greater than investment efficiency of unlisted firms. The results mean that listed firms have superior financial reporting quality than unlisted firms, which suppress over-investment caused by opportunistic behavior of managers. On the contrary, in the under-investment, the coefficient of LIST is significantly positive (β 1 =0.003, t=4.36), suggesting that investment efficiency of unlisted firms is greater than investment efficiency of listed firms. This finding implies that listed firms are more interested in over-investment than underinvestment.
In sum, the results in Table 4 show that listed firms are more efficient in over-investment, while unlisted firms are more efficient in under-investment. These results mean that there is a difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms according to over-investment and under-investment.
The results of control variables are generally consistent with prior study (Chen et al., 2011) . Audit of Big 4 audit firms (BIG4), firm size (SIZE), and financial reporting quality (FRQ1, FRQ2, FRQ3 ) show significant negative (-) relationships with investment efficiency (InvEff). This finding indicates that the firms employing a Big 4 audit firm are showing relatively high investment efficiency, and large-scale firms have high investment efficiency due to the monitoring effect of stakeholders. In addition, financial reporting quality mitigates over-investment and underinvestment (Chen et al., 2011) .
Tangible assets (TANG), length of the operating cycle (OPCYCLE), return on assets (ROA), operating cash flow to sales (Cfo_Sales), and volatility of sales (Std_Sales) show significant positive (+) relationships with investment efficiency (InvEff). The results show that there is a tendency to make an investment that deviates from proper investment when operating cash flow volatility and sales volatility are high and losses occur. Table 5 provides the regression results of testing H2 that listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm will have a greater investment efficiency than those that do not. In the full sample, the coefficient of LIST*BIG4 is negative and significant (β 1 =-0.006, t=-3.05) at 0.01 level. This finding indicates that Big 4 audit firms have more efficient resources and expertise in performing an audit, which increases the credibility of accounting information and improves investment efficiency.
Effect of Big 4 Audit Firms on Investment Efficiency
In the over-investment, the coefficient of LIST*BIG4 is significantly negative (β 1 =-0.010, t=-2.84) at 0.01 level. On the contrary, in the under-investment, the coefficient of LIST*BIG4 is not significant. The results suggest that just as firms' litigation risk is greater in upward earnings management than downward earnings management, the audit effect of Big 4 audit firms in the over-investment sample greatly contributed to the restraint of over-investment compared to the under-investment sample. 
Additional Analysis
Propensity-Score Matching
The primary difference between listed and unlisted firms is size, and size can account for investment efficiency. Thus, we rely on propensity score matched (PSM) samples. For the PSM approach, we use the log of total assets, return on equity, financial leverage, and asset growth. In the first step, a logit model is estimated to predict the probability that the firm is unlisted, conditional on the four matching characteristics. We then match, without replacement, firms that are listed and unlisted, based on closeness to the predicted value from the first step. The PSM approach generates samples in which listed and unlisted firms are more similar, which helps mitigate concerns that omitted correlated variables are driving our results. Table 6 provides the regression results of testing H1 using Propensity Score Matching (PSM). In the full sample, the coefficient of LIST is not significantly negative (β 1 =-0.001, t=-0.62). In the over-investment, the coefficient of LIST is significantly negative (β 1 =-0.008, t=-3.63), suggesting that investment efficiency of listed firms is greater than investment efficiency of unlisted firms. On the contrary, in the under-investment, the coefficient of LIST is significantly positive (β 1 =0.003, t=4.36), suggesting that investment efficiency of unlisted firms is greater than investment efficiency of listed firms. The regression results of testing H1 using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) are consistent with the results of Table 4 . In sum, the results in Table 6 show that listed firms are more efficient in overinvestment, while unlisted firms are more efficient in under-investment. These results mean that there is a difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms according to over-investment and under-investment. Table 7 provides the regression results of testing H2 using Propensity Score Matching (PSM). In the full sample and over-investment sample, the coefficient of LIST*BIG4 is not significantly negative. On the contrary, in the underinvestment, the coefficient of LIST*BIG4 is negative and significant (β 1 =-0.003, t=-2.19) at 0.05 level. This finding indicates that Big 4 audit firms have more efficient resources and expertise in performing an audit, which increases the credibility of accounting information and improves investment efficiency. The regression results of testing H2 using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) are inconsistent with the results of Table 4 . These results mean that there is a difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms according to over-investment and underinvestment. 
Difference in Investment Efficiency between KOSPI, KOSDAQ Listed Firms and Unlisted Firms
Even in the case of listed firms, there are several differences in the case of KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price Index) and KOSDAQ (Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation) listed firms. The KOSDAQ market operates almost similarly to the operating system of the US Nasdaq market. In the KOSPI market, existing traditional firms and large-scale firms are listed, and small and medium-sized firms such as venture firms with technology and growth potential are listed on the KOSDAQ market. Thus, differences in market characteristics between KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed firms are expected to affect the FRQ. Table 8 provides the regression results of retesting H1 by classifying listed firms as KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed firms. In the full sample, the coefficient of KOSPI is significantly negative (β 1 =-0.008, t=-6.01) at one percent level. In the over-investment, the coefficient of KOSPI is significantly negative (β 1 =-0.019, t=-6.23) at one percent level. The results show that the KOSPI listed firms have higher investment efficiency than the unlisted firms. However, the coefficient of KOSDAQ is not significant in the full and over-investment sample. The difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms is due to the difference effect of the KOSPI listed firms among listed firms. In addition, in the under-investment, the coefficient of KOSPI is significantly negative (β 1 =0.005, t=5.45), suggesting that the investment efficiency of unlisted firms is a greater than that of KOSPI listed firms. 
CONCLUSION
We examine the difference in investment efficiency between listed and unlisted firms and the effect of auditing by Big 4 audit firms on the investment efficiency of firms. Generally, listed firms are large in size, have a high level of stakeholders' demands on the firm information, and show large ripple effects of managers' decision. Prior studies show that listed firms have a greater FRQ than unlisted firms. The higher financial reporting quality has been shown to reduce both the under-investments of firms that face financial constraints and the over-investments occurring in firms that have large amounts of cash and free cash flows (Biddle et al. 2009 ).
As a result of the study, in the analysis of full samples, the listed firms have significantly higher investment efficiency than the unlisted ones. In the over-investment samples, it is found that the listed firms have higher investment efficiency. On the contrary, in the under-investment samples, it is found that the unlisted firms have higher investment efficiency. In addition, it is found that listed firms employing a Big 4 audit firm have a greater investment efficiency. In further analysis, listed firms are classified into the KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed firms. As a result of comparing with the unlisted firms, it is found that the KOSPI listed firms have higher investment efficiency than the KOSDAQ listed firms and unlisted firms.
This study makes the following contributions. First, this study is expected to help in understanding the characteristics of financial reporting provided by listed and unlisted firms by presenting empirical results on investment efficiency as over-investment and under-investment. Second, our results show that the audit by Big 4 audit firms produces high quality accounting information and affects the improvement of investment efficiency. Finally, it is expected that it will provide useful information on investment efficiency by expanding the scope of research and making the measurement of variables more precise. Limitations of our study include the fact that there is still a problem of omitted variables in the regression model of investment efficiency. The Clute Institute
APPENDIX Variable Descriptions Dependent Variables
InvEff = a proxy of investment efficiency, which is measured as the values of residuals from investment forecasting model, if residuals are greater than 0, it is over-investment, and if residuals are less than 0, it is underinvestment (under-investment is the absolute values); Explanitory Variables LIST = an indicator variable that if a firm is a listed firm, it takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise; BIG4 = an indicator variable that if a firm hires a Big 4 audit firm, it takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise; Control Variables SIZE = the natural log of total assets; TANG = the ratio of tangible assets, measured as (equipment, plant, and property)/total assets; SLACK = the ratio of cash holding, measured as cash/total assets; OPCYCLE = operating cycle: (average accounts receivables/sales)×365 + (average inventory/cost of goods sold)×365; LOSS = an indicator variable that if a firm reports a loss, it takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise; ROA = return on assets, measured as net income/lagged total assets; Cfo_Sales = the ratio of operating cash flow, measured as operating cash flow/sales; FRQ1 = the absolute residuals of the Kothari et al. (2005) 
